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Abstract
We generalize the characterizations of the positive core and the positive prekernel to TU games
with precedence constraints and show that the positive core is characterized by non-emptiness (NE),
boundedness (BOUND), covariance under strategic equivalence, closedness (CLOS), the reduced game
property (RGP), the reconfirmation property (RCP) for suitably generalized Davis-Maschler reduced
games, and the possibility of nondiscrimination. The bounded positive core, i.e., the union of all
bounded faces of the positive core, is characterized similarly. Just RCP has to be replaced by a
suitable weaker axiom, a weak version of CRGP (the converse RGP) has to be added, and CLOS
can be deleted. For classical games the prenucleolus is the unique further solution that satisfies the
axioms, but for games with precedence constraints it violates NE as well as the prekernel. The positive
prekernel, however, is axiomatized by NE, anonymity, reasonableness, the weak RGP, CRGP, and
weak unanimity for two-person games (WUTPG), and the bounded positive prekernel is axiomatized
similarly by requiring WUTPG only for classical two-person games and adding BOUND.
Keywords: TU games, restricted cooperation, game with precedence constraints, positive core, bounded
core, positive prekernel, prenucleolus
JEL Classification: C71
1 Introduction
Since the seminal paper of Faigle (1989) introducing the idea of restricted cooperation, that is, considering
the possibility to have unfeasible or forbidden coalitions, many investigations have been done in order
to study or adapt the main solution concepts of classical TU games, for various structures of the set of
feasible coalitions.
Considering a finite set of players N and a collection of feasible coalitions F ⊆ 2N , many structures
borrowed from combinatorial optimization and partially ordered sets have been proposed for F : feasible
coalitions induced by distributive lattices (Faigle and Kern 1992, Gilles, Owen, and van den Brink 1992,
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Derks and Gilles 1995), convex geometries (Bilbao, Lebro´n, and Jime´nez 1998), union-stable systems
(Algaba, Bilbao, Borm, and Lo´pez 2000), antimatroids (Algaba, Bilbao, van den Brink, and Jime´nez-
Losada 2004), regular set systems (Lange and Grabisch 2009), to cite a few (see a survey in Grabisch
2012 ). The case of distributive lattices appears to be of special interest since it corresponds by Birkhoff’s
theorem to a situation which is often encountered in practice: the presence of a hierarchy, or any kind of
partial order , on the set of players N . In this case, feasible coalitions are those satisfying the following
rule: if player i is present, then any of its subordinates j ≺ i must be present (this is called by Faigle
and Kern “precedence constraints”). Moreover, the set of feasible coalitions is closed under union and
intersection. For these reasons, we precisely focus in this paper on this type of structure1.
Considering that F is a distributive lattice induced by some partial order on N , the core of games on
such structures has already deserved much attention, and many results valid for classical games have
been extended to this case, in particular, the Shapley-Ichiishi theorem (Shapley 1971, Ichiishi 1981)
characterizing convex TU games (Derks and Gilles 1995, Grabisch and Sudho¨lter 2014). The essential
difference with classical games is that a nonempty core is always (unless F = 2N ) unbounded, however
it is pointed. Extremal rays of the core have been found by Tomizawa (1983), and bounded facets have
been studied by Grabisch (2011). The set of all bounded facets of the core, called the bounded core, has
been studied and axiomatized by Grabisch and Sudho¨lter (2012). From the interpretation point of view,
it is the set of core elements for which any player takes the maximum from its subordinates.
Other solution concepts like the nucleolus, the kernel, etc. have been much less studied in the context
of restricted cooperation. It is the main purpose of this paper to fill this gap for games with precedence
constraints. The excess of a coalition, i.e., the difference of its worth and its payoff, may be regarded as
a measure of dissatisfaction, if it is positive, whereas a coalition is satisfied if its excess is not positive.
However, the prenucleolus lexicographically minimizes the non-increasingly ordered vector of all excesses,
and for an element of the prekernel, the maximum surplus of any pair of players is balanced, even if it
is negative. The positive core (Orshan and Sudho¨lter 2010) and the positive prekernel (Sudho¨lter and
Peleg 2000) are defined similarly – only a negative excess or negative surplus that cannot be regarded as
dissatisfaction is not taken into account. It turns our that to consider these two solutions when precedence
constraints are available has several advantages. The main advantages are:
• Both the positive core and the positive prekernel of a game with precedence constraints are non-
empty, whereas the prenucleoulus as well as the prekernel do not exist in this framework.
• Both solutions, the positive core and the positive prekernel on the set of games with precedence
constraints are characterized similarly, but in some sense simpler, by intuitive properties as for
classical games.
1We mention here the dual view of distributive lattices, introduced by Gilles, Owen, and van den Brink (1992), and
developed by, e.g., Derks and Gilles (1995) or van den Brink and Gilles (1996). There, hierarchies are interpreted as
permission structures, in the sense that feasible coalitions are those who contain all superiors of its members, i.e., if i is
present and i ≺ j, then j must be present. Under this viewpoint, players must have their superiors present, who permit
them to act. By contrast, under our viewpoint, feasible coalitions S may be considered as teams to whom some task or
project is assigned. The task can be achieved only if all subordinates are present in S, and v(S) represents the benefit
induced by the realization of the task by S. This point of view is discussed by Grabisch and Xie (2007) in detail.
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Indeed, we prove that the positive core can be axiomatized in a way which is very close to the classical
case, up to suitably generalizing the axioms, namely by non-emptiness (NE), reasonableness (REAS),
covariance (COV), the reduced game property (RGP), the reconfirmation property (RCP), nondiscrimi-
nation (ND), and closedness (CLOS), the latter permitting to eliminate the relative interior of the positive
core as a candidate for the solution. The positive core being unbounded unless F = 2N , we propose like-
wise the bounded positive core, which has the same intuitive interpretation as for the bounded core. We
find that it can be axiomatized by NE, COV, RGP, RCP restricted to classical games, ND, boundedness
(BOUND), and a variant of the converse reduced game property, called RCRGP. The bounded positive
core contains a particular point, which can be considered as the prenucleolus of the game, since it coincides
with the usual prenucleolus when F = 2N . It lexicographically minimizes the excesses of all coalitions in
F the complements of which are also in F , and then lexicographically maximizes the remaining excesses
so that they are non-positive (thereby keeping the idea that players should take the maximum of their
subordinates, while guaranteeing minimal losses if any). Now, the positive prekernel of any game contains
the positive core of the game. We show that it is characterized by NE, anonymity (AN), REAS, a weak
RGP property, CRGP, and weak unanimity for 2-persons games (WUTPG).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the basic material on partially ordered sets, the core,
and the bounded core of games with precedence constraints. Section 3 introduces and characterizes
the positive core. Section 4 is devoted to the bounded positive core and introduces the a possible
substitute of the prenucleolus, for which a Kohlberg-like criterion is given. The positive prekernel and
its axiomatization are addressed in Section 5. In Section 6 we show that, except ND and RCRGP, each
of axioms employed in the various characterizations is logically independent of the remaining axioms. It
is not known whether ND or ND and RCRGP are needed in the characterizations of the positive core or
its bounded variant, respectively.
2 Notation, Definitions, and Preliminaries
A partially ordered set (poset) is a pair (P,) such that P is a nonempty finite set and  is a partial
order on P , i.e., a reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive binary relation on P . As usual, we write x  y
for (x, y) ∈  and use x ≺ y if x  y and x 6= y. If x ≺ y and there is no z ∈ P such that x ≺ z ≺ y then
y covers x, denoted by x ≺· y. A chain in (P,) is a sequence (x0, . . . , xq) such that x0 ≺ · · · ≺ xq where
q is called the length of the chain. The height of a poset is the length of a longest chain. The height of
x ∈ P , denoted by h(x), is the maximal length of a chain from a minimal element to x.
Let U , |U | > 3, be a set, the universe of players. A coalition is a finite nonempty subset of U . Let N
be a coalition and (N,) be a poset. Then S ⊆ N is a downset of (N,) if i ∈ S and j  i implies
j ∈ S. Denote by O(N,) the set of downsets of (N,). Note that (O(N,),⊆) is a distributive lattice
of height2 |N |. By Birkhoff’s representation theorem the opposite statement is also true: If F ⊆ 2N and
(F ,⊆) is a distributive lattice of height |N |, then there exists a poset (N,) such that F = O(N,).
2A poset (P,) is a lattice if for any x, y ∈ P their supremum, denoted x ∧ y, and infimum, denoted x ∨ y, exist. A
lattice is distributive if ∧ and ∨ satisfy distributivity.
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A (cooperative TU) game with precedence constraints (Faigle and Kern 1992) is a triple (N,, v) such
that N is a coalition, (N,) is a poset, and v : O(N,) → R, v(∅) = 0. Note that a classical TU game
is a pair (N, v) such that v : 2N → R, v(∅) = 0. Hence, we may identify a game (N, v) with (N,, v)
where (N,) is the poset of height 0. Let Γ denote the set of TU games with precedence constraints.
Throughout this section let (N,, v) be a game with precedence constraints and denote F = O(N,).
Let
X∗(N, v) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) 6 v(N)} and X(N, v) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) = v(N)}
denote the set of feasible and Pareto efficient feasible payoffs (preimputations), respectively. We use
x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi (x(∅) = 0) for every S ∈ 2
N and every x ∈ RN as a convention. Additionally, xS denotes
the restriction of x to S, i.e. xS = (xi)i∈S , and we write x = (xS , xN\S).
The core of (N,, v), denoted by C(N,, v), is defined by
C(N,, v) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) = v(N) and x(S) > v(S) for all S ∈ F}. (2.1)
By its definition, the core of (N,, v) is a convex polyhedral set. It is well known (Derks and Gilles 1995)
that it does not contain lines. More precisely,
C(N,, v) = conv(ext(C(N,, v))) + C(N,, 0), (2.2)
where the game 0 assigns 0 to each element of F , “conv” means “convex hull”, “ext” means “set of
extreme points”, and “+” denotes “Minkowski sum”. For any S ⊆ N, let NχS = χS ∈ RN be the
indicator function of S, i,e. χSi = 1 for i ∈ S and χ
S
j = 0 for j ∈ N \ S. If (N,, v) is a classical game,
i.e., if the height of (N,) is 0, then C(N,, 0) = {0}. Otherwise, i.e., if there exists a pair (i, j) ∈ N×N
such that i ≺ j, then (Derks and Gilles 1995)
C(N,, 0) = cone({χ{i} − χ{j} | i, j ∈ N, i ≺ j}), (2.3)
where “cone” denotes “convex cone generated by”. For i ≺ j, say i = i0 ≺· · · · ≺· ik = j,
χ{i} − χ{j} =
k−1∑
ℓ=0
χ{iℓ} − χ{iℓ+1}
so that
C(N,, 0) = cone({χ{i} − χ{j} | i, j ∈ N, i ≺· j}) (2.4)
(also shown by Tomizawa (1983), see also Fujishige (2005, Th. 3.26)).
The bounded core of (N,, v), denoted by Cb(N,, v), is the set of all elements x ∈ C(N,, v) that satisfy
the following condition for any i, j ∈ N with i ≺· j: There is no ε > 0 such that x + ε
(
χ{j} − χ{i}
)
∈
C(N,, v). Hence,
Cb(N,, v) = {x ∈ C(N,, v) | ({x} − C(N,, 0)) ∩ C(N,, v) = {x}}.
Therefore, if (N,, v) is a classical game, the bounded core coincides with the classical core.
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Remark 2.1 According to Rockafellar (1970, Section 18) a closed convex set is the disjoint union of
the relative interiors of its faces. Hence, any element of Cb(N,, v) is in the interior of some face of
C(N,, v). We conclude that Cb(N,, v) is the disjoint union of the relative interiors of the bounded
faces of C(N,, v), i.e., Cb(N,, v) is the union of all bounded faces of C(N,, v). Thus, the bounded
core is connected.
The bounded core may be non-convex and, hence, a proper subset of the convex hull of the extreme
points of the core (called “convex part of the core”) even if the poset is connected as Example 2.2 shows.
We say that i, j ∈ S ⊆ N are connected in (S,) if there is a path in S that connects i and j, that is,
if there exist k ∈ N and i1, . . . , ik ∈ N such that i = i1, j = ik, and, for each ℓ = 1, . . . , k − 1, either
iℓ ≺ iℓ+1 or iℓ+1 ≺ iℓ. Any ∅ 6= S ⊆ N may be partitioned into its connected components, and S ⊆ N is
connected if S = ∅ or S consists of a single component.
Example 2.2 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and (N,, v) be defined by i ≺ 4 for i ∈ T = {1, 2, 3} and, for S ∈ F ,
v(S) = 6 if |S ∩ T | = 2, v(N) = 12, and v(S) = 0, otherwise. Then (0, 6, 6, 0), (6, 0, 6, 0), (6, 6, 0, 0) ∈
Cb(N,, v), but the convex midpoint of these points x = (4, 4, 4, 0) /∈ Cb(N,, v) because (2, 4, 4, 2) ∈
C(N,, v), which can be obtained from (4, 4, 4, 0) by a transfer (−2, 0, 0, 2).
One can show that the vertices of Cb(N,, v) are (0, 6, 6, 0), (6, 0, 6, 0), (6, 6, 0, 0) and (3, 3, 3, 3). Then,
the bounded core is the union of the three segments between (3, 3, 3, 3) and each of the vertices (0, 6, 6, 0),
(6, 0, 6, 0), and (6, 6, 0, 0). Indeed, any point in the segment between (3, 3, 3, 3) and (0, 6, 6, 0) has the form
(3α,−3α+6,−3α+6, 3α), and any transfer ε(χ{4}−χ{i}) for i ≺ 4 would lead to a point outside the core.
The same conclusion holds for the two other segments by symmetry. Now, consider the point (3, 3, 5, 1),
which is the midpoint of (0, 6, 6, 0), (6, 0, 6, 0) and (3, 3, 3, 3). Observe that a transfer (0, 0,−2, 2) on this
point would give (3, 3, 3, 3) ∈ C(N,, v), hence it does not belong to the bounded core. By symmetry
again, any point in the relative interior of the convex hull of (3, 3, 3, 3) and any two of the vertices
(0, 6, 6, 0), (6, 0, 6, 0), and (6, 6, 0, 0) is outside the bounded core.
For any S ∈ F and x ∈ RN , let e(S, x, v) = v(S)− x(S) be the excess at x.
For any α ∈ R the α-core of (N,, v), denoted by Cα(N,, v), is the set
Cα(N,, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | e(S, x, v) 6 α∀S ∈ F \ {∅, N}}.
We now generalize (2.2). Let vα be defined by as vα(S) = v(S) − α for all S ∈ F \ {∅, N}. Then
Cα(N,, v) = C(N,, vα) so that
Cα(N,, v) = conv(ext(Cα(N,, v))) + C(N,, 0). (2.5)
The following lemma is a preparation for Proposition 2.4 that will be frequently used in the remainder
(e.g., in Remark 3.2 and in the proof of Proposition 5.2).
Lemma 2.3 If (N,) is connected (i.e., N consists of a unique connected component) and α ∈ R, then
Cα(N,, v) 6= ∅.
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Proof: Let w = vα. By Lemma 3.2 of Grabisch and Sudho¨lter (2012), C(N,, w) 6= ∅ and the proof is
finished by (2.5). q.e.d.
Let (N,∗) be the reverse partially ordered set (i.e., i ∗ j iff j  i). Note that O(N,∗) = {S ⊆
N | N \ S ∈ F}. Hence, (N,) is connected iff (N,∗) is connected. The dual game of (N,, v) is the
game (N,∗, v∗) defined by v∗(S) = v(N) − v(N \ S) for all S ∈ O(N,∗). As for classical games, if
x ∈ X(N, v) and S ∈ O(N,∗), then
e(S, x, v∗) = v∗(S)− x(S) = v(N)− v(N \ S)− x(N) + x(N \ S) = −e(N \ S, x, v). (2.6)
Hence
C−α(N,
∗, v∗) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | e(S, x, v) > α∀S ∈ F \ {∅, N}} for all α ∈ R. (2.7)
In order to generalize Lemma 2.3 and (2.5) to games that do not necessarily have a connected hierarchy,
we define the intermediate game (see Owen (1977) for a similar construction) of (N,, v) as follows.
Denote by R(N,) = R the partition of N whose elements are the connected components of N . In the
present context R is considered as natural set of “a priori unions” and not a “coalition structure” a`
la Aumann and Dre`ze (1974), i.e., we do not consider “component feasible” payoffs. The intermediate
game of (N,, v) is the classical TU game (R, vR) defined by vR(T ) = v (
⋃
T ) for all T ⊆ R. Let
O0(N,) = F0 be the subset of all elements of F that are not unions of connected components. Hence,
F \F0 = {
⋃
T | T ⊆ R}. Now, for any y ∈ X (R, vR) and α ∈ R define the α-core w.r.t. y, Cα,y(N,, v),
by
Cα,y(N,, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | x(T ) = yT∀T ∈ R and e(S, x, v) 6 α∀S ∈ F0}.
By slightly abusing notation, for any S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, the sub-poset of (N,) on S, i.e., the intersection
of  and S × S, is denoted by (S,). For simplicity, we denote the partition of connected components
of S, R(S,), by R(S) and the sublattice O(S,) = {T ∩ S | T ∈ F} by F(S).
Proposition 2.4 For any game (N,, v) with precedence constraints, any preimputation y of the inter-
mediate game (R, vR), and any α ∈ R,
Cα,y(N,, v) 6= ∅ and Cα,y(N,, v) = conv(ext(Cα,y(N,, v))) + C(N,, 0).
Proof: Let F0 = O0(N,) and R = R(N ,). To show non-emptiness we construct the components of
some x ∈ Cα,y(N,, v) as follows. Let β > (−α)+max{v(S) | S ∈ F0}−min{y(T ) | T ⊆ R} and β > 0.
For Q ∈ R define (Q,, vQ) by
vQ(S) =


0 , if S = ∅,
yQ , if S = Q,
β , if S ∈ F(Q) \ {∅, Q}.
As (Q,) is connected there exists xQ ∈ C(Q,, vQ) by Lemma 2.3. Hence, x(Q) = yQ for all Q ∈ R.
Let S ∈ F0 and T̂ = {Q ∈ R | Q ⊆ S}. Then there exists Q̂ ∈ R such that ∅ 6= Q̂ ∩ S 6= S. As β > 0,
x(S) = x(S ∩ Q̂) + x(S \ Q̂) > β + y(T̂ ) > −α+ v(S) + max{−y(T ) | T ⊆ R}+ y(T̂ ) > −α+ v(S).
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Hence v(S)− x(S) 6 α.
The observation that z(Q) = 0 for any z ∈ C(N,, 0) and any Q ∈ R implies the second statement of
the proposition. q.e.d.
Note that for any y ∈ X (R, vR),
C−α,y(N,
∗, v∗) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | x(T ) = yT∀T ∈ R, e(S, x, v) > α∀S ∈ F0} for all α ∈ R. (2.8)
3 The positive core
This section is devoted to the positive core. In the first subsection we generalize its definition to games
with precedence constraints, and in the second subsection we present a characterization by simple and
intuitive properties.
3.1 Definition of the positive core
In order to expand the definition of the positive core (Orshan and Sudho¨lter 2010) to TU games with
precedence constraints, we employ and recall Justman’s (1977) notion of a “general nucleolus” (Schmeidler
1969).
Let D be a finite nonempty set, X be a set, let h : X → RD, and denote d := |D|. Define θ : X → Rd by
θt(x) = max
T⊆D,|T |=t
min
i∈T
hi(x) for all x ∈ X and all t = 1, . . . , d,
that is, for any x ∈ X , θ(x) is the vector, whose components are the numbers hi(x), i ∈ D, arranged
in non-increasing order. Let ≥lex denote the lexicographical order of Rd. The nucleolus of h w.r.t. X ,
NUC(h,X), is defined by
NUC(h,X) = {x ∈ X | θ(y) ≥lex θ(x) for all y ∈ X}.
Let (N,, v) ∈ Γ, F = O(N,),R = R(N,), and recall that F \F0 = {
⋃
T | T ⊆ R} . Then the positive
core of (N,, v), denoted by C+(N,, v), is defined by
C+(N,, v) = NUC((e(S, ·, v)+)S∈F , X
∗(N, v))
where t+ = max{0, t} for t ∈ R. Let x ∈ C+(N,, v). Then x ∈ X(N, v) (otherwise there are positive
excesses and all of them could be diminished) and, e(S, x, v) 6 0 for all S ∈ F0 (otherwise, if e(S, x, v) > 0
for some S ∈ F0, then there exist ℓ 6∈ S ∋ k, k ≺· ℓ, and one could diminish this excess and the excesses
of all S′ ∈ F0, ℓ 6∈ S′ ∋ k, by a transfer t(χ{k} − χ{ℓ}), t > 0, without changing the excesses of further
coalitions). We conclude that
C+(N,, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | (x(Q))Q∈R ∈ C+(R, vR) and e(S, x, v) 6 0 for all S ∈ F0}. (3.1)
It is well-known that for a classical TU game (N, v) the prenucleolus, i.e., the set
NUC((e(S, ·, v))S⊆N , X
∗(N, v)),
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consists of a single element ν(N, v) (the prenucleolus point) and that
C+(N, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | e(S, x, v)+ = e(S, ν(N, v), v)+ for all S ⊆ N}. (3.2)
Now, let ν be the prenucleolus point of the intermediate game (R, vR) and define (N,, w) by w (
⋃
T ) =
ν(T ) for all T ⊆ R such that e(T , ν, vR) > 0 and w(S) = v(S) for all other S ∈ F . By (3.2),
C+(N,, v) = C(N,, w) so that, by (2.2),
C+(N,, v) = conv(ext(C(N,, w))) + C(N,, 0)
and we may define the bounded positive core by
Cb+(N,, v) = C
b(N,, w). (3.3)
We conclude this subsection by first remarking that Kohlberg’s (1971) characterizations of the prenucle-
olus may suitably be modified for the positive core and secondly by briefly discussing various bargaining
sets for games with precedence constraints.
Remark 3.1 The variant of the “Kohlberg (1971) criterion” for the positive core of classical games is
still valid. For (N,, v) ∈ Γ and x ∈ RN and α ∈ R let D(α, x, v) = {N} ∪ {S ∈ F | e(S, x, v) > α}
where F = O(N,, v). Recall that D ⊆ 2N is balanced if there are balancing coefficients for D, i.e., there
are δS > 0, S ∈ D such that
∑
S∈D δSχ
S = χN . If x ∈ X(N, v), then following statements are equivalent
(Orshan and Sudho¨lter 2010, Theorem 3.4):
x ∈ C+(N,, v) (3.4)
α > 0, y ∈ RN , y(N) = 0, y(S) > 0∀S ∈ D(α, x, v) =⇒ y(S) = 0∀S ∈ D(α, x, v) (3.5)
α > 0 =⇒ D(α, x, v) is balanced (3.6)
We also note that the definitions of the classical bargaining set and its variants use the notion of “indi-
vidual” objections. In a TU game (N,, v) with precedence constraints a player ℓ ∈ N has no objection
against any of her subordinates k ≺ ℓ so that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler pre-bargaining set (Aumann
and Maschler 1964, Davis and Maschler 1967), the reactive pre-bargaining set (Granot 1994), and the
semireactive pre-bargaining set (Sudho¨lter and Potters 2001) consist of all preimputations x so that
(x(Q))Q∈R belongs to the respective pre-bargaining set of the intermediate game (R, vR) and, moreover,
e(S, x, v) 6 0 for all S ∈ F0. For the Mas-Colell pre-bargaining (Mas-Colell 1989) of (N,, v) we only
have one inclusion: If (y(Q))Q∈R belongs to the Mas-Colell pre-bargaining set of the intermediate game
and if e(S, x, v) 6 0 for all S ∈ F0, then y belongs to the Mas-Colell pre-bargaining set of (N,, v).
However, the positive core is a subset of any of the mentioned pre-bargaining sets.
3.2 Characterization of the positive core
On classical games the prenucleolus and the positive core are the unique solutions that satisfy a collection
of plausible properties. In this section we show that the positive core on the set of TU games with
precedence constraints is characterized by these axioms.
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We first recall the mentioned axioms of a solution. Let F = O(N,) wherever it occurs in this section.
Let (N,, v) ∈ Γ, ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , x ∈ RN , and let π : N → N be a bijection (a permutation of N). The
reduced game of (N,, v) w.r.t. S and x is the game (S,, vS,x) defined by
vS,x(T ) =


0 , if T = ∅,
v(N)− x(N \ S) , if T = S,
max{v(P )− x(P \ T ) | P ∈ F , P ∩ S = T } , if T ∈ F(S) \ {∅, S}.
(3.1)
The permutation π is a symmetry of (N,, v) if {π(S) | S ∈ F} = F and v(π(S)) = v(S) for all S ∈ F .
Let SYM(N,, v) denote the set of symmetries.
A solution is a mapping σ that assigns a subset σ(N,, v) of X∗(N, v) to any (N,, v) ∈ Γ. Its restriction
to a set Γ′ ⊆ Γ is again denoted by σ. Moreover, a solution on Γ′ is the restriction to Γ′ of some solution.
Hence, if we do not explicitly specify the domain of a solution, then the domain is Γ, the set of all games
with precedence constraints. A solution σ on Γ′ ⊆ Γ satisfies
• non-emptiness (NE) if σ(N,, v) 6= ∅ for all (N,, v) ∈ Γ′;
• Pareto optimality (PO) if σ(N,, v) ⊆ X(N, v) for all (N,, v) ∈ Γ′;
• Covariance under strategic equivalence (COV) if, for all (N,, v), (N,, w) ∈ Γ′, α > 0, and β ∈
R
N , the following holds: If w(S) = αv(S)+β(S) for all S ∈ F , then σ(N,, w) = ασ(N,, v)+β;
• Anonymity (AN) if, for all (N,, v) ∈ Γ′ and all bijective mappings π : N → N ′ the following
holds: If (N ′,′, πv) ∈ Γ′, where π(i) ′ π(j) iff i  j, (πv)(π(S)) = v(S) for all S ⊆ F , and
π(x) = y ∈ RN
′
is defined by yπ(i) = xi∀x ∈ R
N , ∀i ∈ N , then σ(N ′,′, πv) = π(σ(N,, v));
• reasonableness (REAS) if, for all (N,, v) ∈ Γ′ and all x ∈ σ(N,, v) the following property holds
for each minimal element k and each maximal element ℓ in N :
xk > min{v(S ∪ {k})− v(S) | S ∈ F , k /∈ S} and xℓ 6 max{v(S)− v(S \ {ℓ}) | S ∈ F , ℓ ∈ S}
(note that for all S ∈ F and for any minimal k ∈ N and maximal ℓ ∈ N , also S ∪ {k} and S \ {ℓ}
belong to F);
• closedness (CLOS) if σ(N,, v) is a closed set for all (N,, v) ∈ Γ′;
• reduced game property (RGP) if the following condition holds: If (N,, v) ∈ Γ′, ∅ 6= S ⊆ N, and
x ∈ σ(N,, v), then (S,, vS,x) ∈ Γ′ and xS ∈ σ(S,, vS,x);
• reconfirmation property (RCP) if the following condition holds for every (N,, v) ∈ Γ′, every
x ∈ σ(N,, v), and every ∅ 6= S ⊆ N : If (S,, vS,x) ∈ Γ′ and yS ∈ σ(S,, vS,x), then (yS , xN\S) ∈
σ(N,, v);
• the possibility of nondiscrimination (ND) if, for every (N,, v) ∈ Γ′ with σ(N,, v) 6= ∅, there
exists x ∈ σ(N,, v) such that π(x) = x for all π ∈ SYM(N,, v), i.e., x is invariant under all
symmetries.
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NE, PO, and CLOS are self-explanatory. COV requires that the solution has to be covariant under a
change of unit (we call this scale COV), and covariant under an additional initial endowment to the
players (called translation COV). AN means that the solution should be independent of the labeling of
the players. REAS means that any player k corresponding to a minimal element in the hierarchy should
receive at least her minimal marginal contribution (in particular, at least v({k})), while a player ℓ being
a maximal element should not receive more than her maximal marginal contribution (in particular, not
more than v(N) − v(N \ {ℓ})). RGP means that if x is a solution element, then its restriction to a
subset S should be an element of the solution of the corresponding reduced game. Note that in all our
characterization results we may replace the traditional RGP introduced by Peleg (1986) by the weaker
property that only requires that the restriction to a subset belongs to the solution of the reduced game
provided that this reduced game belongs to the class Γ′ of games under consideration (because in our
characterizations Γ′ is always closed under taking reduced games). RCP means that from a solution
element x and a solution element y of the reduced game on S, one can build another solution element
by concatenating y and xN\S . Lastly, ND means that it is possible to find a solution element invariant
under all symmetries of the game, and thus not favoring any player.
The following important remark is interesting in its own right and used in the proof of Theorem 3.7, the
main result of this section.
Remark 3.2 (1) Let Γfree be the set of classical TU games3. We recall (Orshan and Sudho¨lter 2010,
Theorem 4.1) that, if |U | =∞, there are precisely three solutions on Γfree that satisfy NE, REAS,
COV, RGP, RCP, and ND, namely the prenucleolus, the positive core (C+(·)), or its relative interior,
i.e., rint C+(·). Here, for (N,, v) ∈ Γ and with R = R(N,),
rint C+(N,, v) =

x ∈ C+(N, v)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
e(S, x, v) < 0 for S ∈ F0 or S =
⋃
T for some
T ⊆ R such that e(T , ν(R, vR), vR) < 0

 . (3.2)
For classical TU games, the foregoing set is nonempty because it contains the prenucleolus point.
Hence, by Proposition 2.4 it is also nonempty in the general case so that it indeed coincides with
the relative interior of the positive core.
(2) Note that C+(·) satisfies REAS. Indeed, let (N,, v) ∈ Γ, x ∈ X(N, v), and k, ℓ ∈ N such that
k is minimal and ℓ is maximal. If xk < t := minS∈F ,k/∈S v(S ∪ {k}) − v(S), then choose ε > 0
such that xk + (|N | − 1)ε < t, define y ∈ X(N, v) by yk = xk + (|N | − 1)ε and yi = xi − ε for
all i ∈ N \ {k} and let S ∈ F \ {∅, N}. If k ∈ S, then e(S, y, v) ≤ e(S, x, v) − ε and if k /∈ S,
then e(S, y, v) < e(S ∪ {k}, x, v). As e({k}, x, v) > 0, x /∈ C+(N,, v). Similarly it is shown that
xℓ > maxS∈F ,ℓ∈S v(S)− v(S \ {ℓ}) implies that x /∈ C+(N,, v).
(3) It is straightforward to verify that C+(·) on any Γ′ ⊆ Γ satisfies NE, PO, COV, AN, and CLOS.
We say that Γ′ ⊆ Γ is closed under reduction if, for all (N,, v) ∈ Γ′, ∅ 6= S ⊆ N, and x ∈ X(N, v),
(S,, vS,x) ∈ Γ′.
3When cooperation is not restricted, i.e., all coalitions are feasible, we call a game unrestricted (free).
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Lemma 3.3 Let Γ′ ⊆ Γ.
(1) If Γ′ is closed under reduction, then both C+(·) and rint C+(·) on Γ′ satisfy RGP.
(2) Both C+ and rint C+ on Γ
′ satisfy RCP.
Proof: For C+, Remark 3.1 (3.5) implies (see Theorem 6.3.14 of Peleg and Sudho¨lter 2007) RGP, and
in order to show RCP the relevant part of the proof of Theorem 6.3.14 of RCP may be literally copied.
In the case of rint C+ we may proceed similarly as before to show RGP. The “Kohlberg criterion” has
to be modified only inasmuch as α > 0 has to be replaced by α > 0 in (3.5) and (3.6).
In order to show that rint C+ satisfies RCP, let (N,, v) ∈ Γ, x ∈ rint C+(N,, v), ∅ 6= S ⊆ N ,
y ∈ rint C+(S,, vS,x), T ∈ F = O(N,), and put z = (y, xN\S). We have to show that e(T, z, v) 6
e(T, x, v)+ and that e(T, x, v) < 0 implies e(T, z, v) < 0. If x(T∩S) = y(T∩S), then e(T, x, v) = e(T, z, v).
Hence, we may assume that y(T ∩ S) 6= x(T ∩ S). Therefore T ∩ S ∈ F(S) \ {∅, S}. Let P ⊆ N \ S
such that (T ∩ S) ∪ P ∈ F and vS,x(T ∩ S) = v((T ∩ S)∪ P )− x(P ). By definition of the reduced game,
e((T ∩ S) ∪ P, z, v) > e(T, z, v). If e((T ∩ S) ∪ P, z, v) > 0 or e((T ∩ S) ∪ P, x, v) > 0, then by RCP
of C+, e((T ∩ S) ∪ P, z, v) = e((T ∩ S) ∪ P, x, v) so that x(T ∩ S) = y(T ∩ S) which was excluded. If
e((T ∩ S) ∪ P, z, v) = 0, then e((T ∩ S) ∪ P, x, v) < 0 so that e(S ∩ T, xS , vS,x) < 0 = e(S ∩ T, y, vS,x) so
that y /∈ rint C+(S,, vS,x) by RGP of rint C+. q.e.d.
Lemma 3.4 On any Γ′ ⊆ Γ the positive core satisfies ND.
Proof: For any (N,, v) ∈ Γ′, x ∈ C+(N,, v), and π ∈ SYM(N , v), by AN also π(x) ∈ C+(N,, v).
By convexity of the positive core, y =
∑
π∈ SYM(N,,v)
π(x)
|SYM(N,,v)| ∈ C+(N,, v). Finally, y is
invariant under symmetries. q.e.d.
Lemma 3.5 If σ is a solution that satisfies REAS and RGP, then e(S, x, v) 6 0 for all (N,, v) ∈ Γ, x ∈
σ(N,, v), and all S ∈ O0(N,).
Proof: Let x ∈ σ(N,, v), T ∈ O0(N,), and assume, on the contrary, that e(T, x, v) > 0. Then there
exist k ∈ T and ℓ ∈ N \ T such that k ≺ ℓ. Now, v{k,ℓ},x({k}) > v(T ) − x(T \ {k}) and, by RGP,
x{k,ℓ} ∈ σ({k, ℓ},, v{k,ℓ},x) so that REAS is violated. q.e.d.
Lemma 3.6 Let σ be a solution that satisfies RGP. If, for any (N, v) ∈ Γfree, σ(N, v) ⊆ C+(N, v),
and if, for any (N,, v) ∈ Γ and any x ∈ σ(N,, v), e(T, x, v) 6 0 for all T ∈ O0(N,), then σ is a
subsolution of the positive core, i.e., σ(N,, v) ⊆ C+(N,, v) for (N,, v) ∈ Γ.
Proof: Let S ⊆ N such that |Q∩S| = 1 for all Q ∈ R. For any i ∈ S denote Qi the connected component
that contains i. Hence, the mapping S →R, i 7→ Qi for all i ∈ S, is a bijection. As F(S) = 2S, by RGP
and our assumption, xS ∈ C+(S,, vS,x). Now, let y ∈ RR be defined by yQ = x (
⋃
Q) for all Q ∈ R.
Then, for any T ⊆ S, e(T, xS , vS,x)+ = e({Qi | i ∈ T }, y, vR)+. Indeed, vS,x(T ) = v(T ∪ P ) − x(P )
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for some P ⊆ N \ S such that T ∪ P ∈ F . If e(T, xS , vS,x) > 0 then T ∪ P must be a union of
connected components, hence T ∪ P =
⋃
i∈T Qi so that the foregoing equation is valid. Conversely, if
e({Qi | i ∈ T }, y, vR) > 0, then e({Qi | i ∈ T }, y, vR) = v(
⋃
i∈T Qi)− x(
⋃
i∈T Qi) 6 e(T, xS , vS,x).
By Remark 3.1 (3.5), y ∈ C+(R, vR). The proof is finished by (3.1). q.e.d.
Theorem 3.7 Assume that |U | =∞. There is a unique solution that satisfies NE, REAS, COV, CLOS,
RGP, RCP, and ND, and it is the positive core.
Proof: The positive core satisfies the desired axioms by Remark 3.2, Lemma 3.3, and Lemma 3.4.
In order to show the remaining direction, let σ be a solution that satisfies the desired axioms. On Γfree, σ
must be one of the following three solutions (Orshan and Sudho¨lter 2010, Theorem 4.1): The prenucleolus,
the positive core, or its relative interior. Hence, σ is a subsolution of the positive core by Lemmas 3.5
and 3.6.
Step 1: We claim that, on Γfree, σ is the positive core. In order to show this statement it suffices to
construct a single TU game (M,u) ∈ Γfree such that σ(M,u) \ rint C+(M,u) 6= ∅. For this purpose,
choose any set M ′ of three players, say without loss of generality,M ′ = {1, 2, 3}, and let ′ be defined by
1 ≺′ 2. Moreover, let (M ′,′, u′) ∈ Γ be defined by u′(M) = 2 and u′(S) = 0 for S ∈ F ′ \ {M ′}, where
F ′ = O(M ′,′). Let P = {1, 3}, Q = {2, 3}, and R = {1, 2}. By NE, there exists x ∈ σ(M ′,′, u′).
As x ∈ C+(M ′,′, u′), x1, x3 > 0, x3 6 2, and x(M ′) = 2. Note that all reduced games of (M ′,′, u′)
w.r.t. P or Q belong to Γfree. By RGP, (x2, x3) ∈ σ(Q, u′Q,x). As u
′
Q,x({2}) = −x1, u
′
Q,x({3}) = 0,
(1 − x1, 1) is the prenucleolus of (Q, u′Q,x). As σ(Q, u
′
Q,x) contains the prenucleolus, RCP implies that
y = (x1, 1 − x1, 1) ∈ σ(M ′,′, u′). Now, if x1 = 0, then by RGP (0, 1) ∈ σ(P, u′P,y). However, (0, 1) ∈
C+(P, u
′
P,y) \ rint C+(P, u
′
P,y). If x1 > 0, then by RGP, yR ∈ σ(R,
′, u′R,y). As u
′
R,y({1}) = 0 and
u′R,y(R) = 1, by (translation) COV (x1,−x1) ∈ σ(R,
′, 0) and by (scale) COV, (t,−t) ∈ σ(R,′, 0)
for all t > 0 (choose α = tx1 in the definition of scale COV). By CLOS, (0, 0) ∈ σ(R,
′, 0) so that by
translation COV and RCP, z = (0, 1, 1) ∈ σ(M ′,′, u′). Finally, RGP yields that (0, 1) ∈ σ(P, u′P,z) and
(0, 1) ∈ C+(P, u′P,z) \ rint C+(P, u
′
P,z).
Let (N,, v) ∈ Γ. It remains to show that
C+(N,, v) ⊆ σ(N,, v). (3.3)
Let F = O(N,, v). By Step 1 we may assume that F 6= 2N .
Step 2: We consider the case |N | = 2 first and assume without loss of generality that N = {1, 2} and
1 ≺ 2. By COV we may assume that v(S) = 0 for all S ∈ F . With (M ′,′, u′) defined in Step 1, by NE
there exists y ∈ σ(M ′,′, u′). As in Step 1 we may assume that y3 = 1. By RGP and RCP applied to
R, we may assume that y2 > 0. Furthermore, by RGP and RCP applied to P , we may replace (y1, y3)
by (y1 + y3, 0) ( or by (0, y1 + y3) if necessary because σ(P, u
′
P,y) = C+(P, u
′
P,y)). Thus, there exists
z, z′ ∈ σ(M ′,′, u′) with z1 > 0 and z′1 = 0. By RGP and COV, (z1,−z1), (0, 0) ∈ σ(N,, v) so that by
scale COV, (t,−t) ∈ σ(N,, v) for all t > 0, i.e., σ(N,, v) = C+(N,, v).
Now the proof of (3.3) can be finished by induction on |N |. For |N | = 1, C+(N,, v) is a singleton so that
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(3.3) holds by NE and Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6. For |N | = 2, Step 2 shows (3.3). Assume that (3.3) is proved
whenever |N | 6 k for some t ∈ N with t > 1. If |N | = t+ 1, we may assume by Step 1 that R = R(N,)
contains a non-singleton Q. Let k ∈ Q be minimal. Let A = {xk | x ∈ C+(N,, v)}. Then A = [α,∞[
for some α ∈ R. Indeed, by REAS, A has a lower bound and by closedness, there is a largest lower bound
α. Moreover, let ℓ ∈ Q with k ≺ ℓ. Replacing xk by xk + t and xℓ by xℓ − t for any t > 0 yields another
element of C+(N,, v). Similarly, if y ∈ σ(N,, v), then by RCP applied to {k, ℓ}, we may replace yk by
yk+ t and yℓ by yℓ− t and receive another element of σ(N,, v). Also, by applying RCP to the coalition
N ′ = N \ {k}, by the inductive hypothesis, y′ = (yk, zN ′) ∈ σ(N,, v) for any zN ′ ∈ C+(N
′,, vN ′,y).
By RGP and RCP of C+, C+(N
′,, vN ′,y) = {zN ′ ∈ RN
′
| (yk, zN ′) ∈ C+(N,, v)}. Hence, it remains
to show that σ(N,, v) contains an element x such that xk = α. Let x′ arise from x by replacing xk by
yk and xℓ by xℓ + xk − yk. Then x′ ∈ σ(N,, v) as we have shown. Now, applying RCP to {k, ℓ} allows
us to reverse this modification so that x ∈ σ(N,, v). q.e.d.
4 The prenucleolus and the bounded positive core
This section is devoted to the characterization of the bounded positive core. Let (N,, v) ∈ Γ, F =
O(N,), and R = R(N,). We may rewrite (3.3) as
Cb+(N,, v) = {x ∈ C+(N,, v) | max{e(S, x, v) | S ∈ F , ℓ /∈ S ∋ k} = 0 for all k, ℓ ∈ N, k ≺· ℓ}. (4.1)
Note that Cb+(·) inherits the following properties from C+(·): NE, PO, COV, AN, REAS, and CLOS. We
now define a particular subsolution of Cb+(·) that is single-valued and satisfies ND. Let F
∗ = O(N,∗)
where (N,∗) is the reverse order of (N,). Moreover, denote by ν the prenucleolus of the intermediate
game (R, vR). The prenucleolus of (N,, v) is the set
N (N,, v) = NUC ((e(S, ·, v∗))S∈F∗ , {y ∈ C+(N,, v) | y(Q) = νQ for Q ∈ R}) . (4.2)
Proposition 4.1 For any (N,, v) ∈ Γ, N (N,, v) is a singleton that is contained in Cb+(N,, v).
Proof: Let y ∈ C+(N,, v) such that y(Q) = νQ for all Q ∈ R and define µ∗ = max{e(S, y, v∗) | S ∈
F∗}, µ = max{e(S, y, v) | S ∈ F}, and
X = {x ∈ C+(N,, v) | x(Q) = νQ for all Q ∈ R and e(S, x, v
∗) 6 µ∗ for all S ∈ F∗}.
Then X 6= ∅ because y ∈ X . Therefore
N (N,, v) = NUC ((e(S, ·, v∗))S∈F∗ , X) .
Moreover, X is closed and convex. We now show that X is bounded. For i ∈ N let h(i) the height of i
w.r.t. (N,). Let x ∈ X . If h(i) = 0, then i ∈ F and, hence, xi > v({i})−µ. Moreover, N \ {i} ∈ F
∗ so
that x(N \ {i}) > v∗(N \ {i})− µ∗, i.e., xi 6 µ∗ + v({i}). Assume now that we have shown already that
all xi with h(i) < k for some k ∈ N are bounded. If, now, h(i) = k, then let S = {j ∈ N | j  i}. On the
one hand, xi > v(S)− µ− x(S \ {i}), hence xi has a lower bound because h(j) < k for all j ∈ S \ {i} so
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that the inductive hypothesis can be applied. On the other hand xi 6 µ
∗ + v(S)− x(S \ {i}) so that xi
is bounded from above.
As the excess functions are continuous and convex, and as X is nonempty, compact, and convex, the
prenucleolus NUC ((e(S, ·, v∗))S∈F∗ , X) is a nonempty convex set such that e(S, x, v∗) = e(S, x′, v∗) for
all S ∈ F∗ and (Justman 1977) all x, x′ ∈ N (N,, v). By induction on h∗(i), the height of i w.r.t.
(N,∗) we show that xi = x′i. Indeed, if h
∗(i) = 0, then {i} ∈ F∗ so that e({i}, x, v∗) = e({i}, x′, v∗)
implies xi = x
′
i. If h
∗(i) > 0, then, with S = {j ∈ N | j ∗ i},
e(S, x, v∗) = v∗(S)− x(S \ {i})− xi = v
∗(S)− x′(S \ {i})− x′i = e(S, x
′, v∗)
so that xi = x
′
i by the inductive hypothesis applied to j ∈ S \ {i}. Let ν(N,, v) = ν̂ denote the unique
element of N (N,, v). Moreover, let k, ℓ ∈ N such that k ≺· ℓ. Assume that t = max{e(S, ν̂, v) | S ∈
F , ℓ /∈ S ∋ k} < 0. Let 0 < ε < −t and let x ∈ RN only differ from ν̂ inasmuch as xk = ν̂k − ε
and xℓ = ν̂ℓ + ε. Then x ∈ X and e(T, x, v∗) < e(T, ν̂, v∗) for all T ∈ F∗ such that k /∈ T ∋ ℓ and
e(T, x, v∗) = e(T, ν̂, v∗) for all other T ∈ F∗ which is a contradiction. By (4.1), ν̂ ∈ Cb+(N,, v). q.e.d.
Remark 4.2 The solution N (·) satisfies ND because it is single-valued and satisfies AN.
We provide now a combinatorial characterization of the prenucleolus of (N,, v) by a Kohlberg-like
criterion. To this end, we introduce the following collections, for any Q ∈ R:
D′(α, x, v∗, Q) = {S ∩Q | S ∈ F∗0 , e(S, x, v
∗) > α}
E(x, v,Q) = {T ∩Q | T ∈ F0, x(T ) = v(T )} ∪ {Q},
where F∗0 = O0(N,
∗). For two collections B,B′ in 2N such that B ⊆ B′, we say that B is balanced
within B′ if there exists a collection B ⊆ C ⊆ B′ which is balanced.
Proposition 4.3 Let (N,, v) ∈ Γ, and consider x ∈ C+(N,, v) s.t. x(Q) = νQ for Q ∈ R, where ν
is the prenucleolus of (R, vR). The following are equivalent:
(1) x = N (N,, v)
(2) For α > 0, Q ∈ R, y ∈ RQ, with y(Q) = 0 and y(S) 6 0 for all S ∈ D′(α, x, v∗, Q) ∪ E(x, v,Q), we
have y(S) = 0 for all S ∈ D′(α, x, v∗, Q).
(3) For α > 0 and Q ∈ R, D′ = D′(α, x, v∗, Q) is balanced within D′ ∪ E(x, v,Q).
Proposition 4.3 generalizes Kohlberg’s (1971) characterization of the nucleolus. The equivalence between
(1) and (2) is proved similarly as in the classical case. The equivalence between (2) and (3) which is an
immediate consequence of Farkas’ lemma occurs as a special case of Lemma 2.1 of Derks, Peters, and
Sudho¨lter (2014) and is, e.g., explicitly proved by Derks and Peters (1998).
By Remark 4.2 and Proposition 4.1 the bounded positive core satisfies ND. Moreover, a careful inspection
of the definition of the reduced game together with (4.1) show that, by Lemma 3.3, Cb+(·) also inherits
RGP from C+(·). Thus, Cb+(·) does not satisfy RCP if |U | =∞ by Theorem 3.7.
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In order to characterize the bounded positive core, the following properties of a solution σ on a set Γ′ ⊆ Γ
are useful. The solution σ satisfies
• the converse reduced game property (CRGP) if for (N,, v) ∈ Γ′ with |N | > 2 and x ∈ X(N, v) the
following condition holds: If, for every S ⊆ N with |S| = 2, (S,, vS,x) ∈ Γ′ and xS ∈ σ(S,, vS,x),
then x ∈ σ(N,, v).
• the restricted converse reduced game property (RCRGP) if for (N,, v) ∈ Γ′ and x ∈ X(N, v), with
R = R(N,) the following condition holds: If there exists S ⊆ N such that |S ∩ Q| = 1 for all
Q ∈ R, (S,, vS,x) ∈ Γ, and xS ∈ σ(S, vS,x), and if (T , v) ∈ Γ′ and xT ∈ σ(T,, vT,x), for any
T = {k, ℓ} ⊆ N with k ≺· ℓ, then x ∈ σ(N,, v);
• the unrestricted reconfirmation property (RCPfree) if the restriction of σ to Γ′ ∩Γfree satisfies RCP;
• boundedness (BOUND) if σ(N,, v) is a bounded set for all (N,, v) ∈ Γ′.
The property BOUND is self-explanatory. Note that for a solution on Γfree, REAS implies BOUND, but
in general such an implication does not exist.
RCRGP has not been used in the literature. It may be interpreted as follows. If every “block”, i.e., every
connected component, may select a representative so that the coalition of representatives S is satisfied
with the preimputation x (i.e., xS ∈ σ(S, vS,x)) and if every pair of players consisting of a player ℓ and
her immediate subordinate k is also satisfied (i.e., xT ∈ σ(T,, vT,x), where T = {k, ℓ}), then no player
in the grand coalition has an objection against x (i.e., x ∈ σ(N,, v)).
As C+(·) satisfied RCP, Cb+(·) satisfies RCP on Γ
free, i.e., Cb+(·) satisfies RCP
free. By (3.3), it also satisfies
BOUND.
The following result may be proved similarly to Lemma 3.6.
Lemma 4.4 The bounded positive core satisfies RCRGP.
Proof: Let (N,, v) ∈ Γ, F = O(N,, v), R = R(N,), and let x ∈ X(N, v) such that x{k,ℓ} ∈
Cb+({k, ℓ},, v{k,ℓ},x) for all k, ℓ ∈ N such that k ≺· ℓ and such that there exists S ⊆ N with |Q∩S| = 1
for all Q ∈ R and xS ∈ Cb+(S, vS,x). For any i ∈ S denote Qi the connected component that contains i.
Hence, the mapping S →R, i 7→ Qi for all i ∈ S, is a bijection.
Let k, ℓ ∈ N such that k ≺· ℓ. Now, v{k,ℓ},x({k}) = v(T )− x(T \ {k}) for some T ∈ F with ℓ /∈ T ∋ k.
As x{k,ℓ} ∈ C
b
+({k, ℓ},, v{k,ℓ},x), 0 = v(T )− x(T ) = max{v(P )− x(P ) | ℓ /∈ P ∋ k, P ∈ F}.
By (3.1) and (4.1) it suffices to show that y = (x(Q))Q∈R ∈ C+(R, vR). Now, xS ∈ C+(S, vS,x). As in
the proof of Lemma 3.6, e(T, xS , vS,x)+ = e({Qi | i ∈ T }, y, vR)+ for all T ⊆ F(S) so that the proof is
finished by (3.5). q.e.d.
We now formulate the main characterization result of this section.
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Theorem 4.5 The bounded positive core is the unique solution that satisfies NE, BOUND, COV, RGP,
RCPfree, ND, and RCRGP, provided |U | =∞.
We postpone the proof and first show a useful variant of Lemma 3.5 and present useful remark.
Lemma 4.6 If σ is a solution that satisfies BOUND, COV, and RGP, then, for any k, ℓ ∈ N such that
k ≺· ℓ with P = {k, ℓ}, σ(P,, vP,x) = Cb(P,, vP,x) for any x ∈ σ(N,, v), which yields
max{e(S, x, v) | ℓ 6∈ S ∋ k, S ∈ F} = 0.
Proof: Let u = vP,x. Define y ∈ RP by yk = xk − u({k}) and yℓ = xℓ + u({k})− u(P ). By RGP and
translation COV, y ∈ σ(P,, 0). By scale COV, ty ∈ σ(P,, 0) for t > 0 so that, by BOUND, y = 0,
which yields xk = max{v(S ∪ {k})− x(S) | k /∈ S ∈ F}. q.e.d.
Remark 4.7 In the proof of Theorem 4.5 we shall employ the following stronger version of Theorem 4.1
of Orshan and Sudho¨lter (2010) in which REAS is replaced by BOUND: If |U | = ∞, then the unique
solutions on Γfree that satisfy NE, BOUND, COV, RGP, and ND, are (a) the prenucleolus, (b) the positive
core, and (c) the relative interior of the positive core. This result is Theorem 4.9 of Orshan and Sudho¨lter
(2001). The article from 2010 is a modification of the discussion paper from 2001. Theorem 4.9 relies
on the lengthy and technically sophisticated proof of Lemma 4.2, whereas when replacing BOUND by
REAS, the proof of the corresponding lemma (Lemma 4.6) takes just a few lines so that the authors used
the well-accepted REAS in their 2010 article basically to offer an easier reading. In the present context,
when restrictions are possible, REAS does not imply BOUND.
Proof of Theorem 4.5: It remains to show the uniqueness part. Let σ be a solution that satisfies the
desired properties. By Lemmas 4.6 and 3.6, σ is a subsolution of Cb+. Thus, it remains to show that
Cb+(N,, v) ⊆ σ(N,, v).
Claim: The solution σ coincides with C+ = C
b
+ on Γ
free. Recall that (M ′,′, u′) ∈ Γ of the proof
of Theorem 3.7 is defined by M ′ = {1, 2, 3}, u′(M) = 2 and u′(S) = 0 for S ∈ F ′ \ {M ′}, where
F ′ = O(M ′,′). Also, let P = {1, 3}, Q = {2, 3}, and R = {1, 2}. By NE, there exists x ∈ σ(M ′,′, u′).
As x ∈ Cb+(M
′,′, u′), x1 = 0 (by (4.1)) and 0 6 x3 6 2. If x3 > 0, then (x1, x3) ∈ C+(P, u′P,x) \
rint C+(P, u
′
P,x), and if x3 = 0, then (x2, x3) ∈ C+(Q, u
′
Q,x) \ rint C+(Q, u
′
Q,x). Hence, our claim is
valid by Remark 4.7 in any case.
Now we can finish the proof. Let x ∈ Cb+(N,, v) and choose any S ⊆ N such that |S ∩ Q| = 1 for
any Q ∈ R(N,). Then (S,) has height 0 so that the reduced game w.r.t. S belongs to Γfree. By RGP
of Cb+, xS ∈ C+(S, vS,x). Hence, by our claim xS ∈ σ(S, vS,x). Moreover, if k, ℓ ∈ N satisfy k ≺· ℓ,
then ({k, ℓ},, v{k,ℓ},x) has a single-valued bounded (positive) core by (4.1). By RGP of C
b
+, the unique
element is (xk, xℓ), i.e., xk = v{k,ℓ},x({k}). Hence, (xk, xℓ) ∈ σ({k, ℓ},, v{k,ℓ},x) by NE of σ. By RCRGP,
x ∈ σ(N,, v). q.e.d.
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Remark 4.8 Assume that |U | = ∞. According to Sobolev (1975), the prenucleolus is the unique solu-
tion on Γfree that satisfies single-valuedness (SIVA), AN, COV, and RGP. For a solution that satisfies
SIVA, however, RGP is equivalent to RCP. Moreover, Orshan (1993) showed that AN may be replaced
by the equal treatment property (ETP), and Orshan and Sudho¨lter (2003) proved that the four axioms
may be replaced by NE, ETP, COV, and RCP. However, a nonempty solution on Γ that contains the
prenucleolus for unrestricted games and satisfies RGP or RCP and COV, cannot coincide with the prenu-
cleolus on Γfree as an easy analysis of the reduced games of (M ′,′, u′) (the game used in the proofs of
the characterizations) shows. Hence, in the foregoing sense there is no “prenucleolus” on Γ.
5 Characterizing the positive prekernel and its bounded variant
This section is devoted to generalize the definition and characterization (Sudho¨lter and Peleg 2000) of
the positive prekernel to games with precedence constraints. Let (N,, v) ∈ Γ, F = O(N,), and
R = R(N,). For x ∈ RN and k, ℓ ∈ N, k 6= ℓ, denote by skℓ(x, v) the maximum surplus of k over ℓ at x,
defined by
skℓ(x, v) = sup{e(S, x, v) | ℓ /∈ S ∋ k}.
The positive prekernel of (N,, v) is the set
PK+(N,, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | skℓ(x, v) 6 sℓk(x, v)+ for all k, ℓ ∈ N, k 6= ℓ}. (5.1)
If the height of (N,) is not 0, i.e., if restrictions are present, then the prekernel (an element x of which,
similarly as in (5.1), has to satisfy skℓ(x, v) = sℓk(x, v)) is empty. Indeed, if k ≺ ℓ, then skℓ(x, v) ∈ R,
but sℓk(x, v) = sup ∅ = −∞. Hence, if x ∈ PK+(N,, v), then skℓ(x, v) 6 0. We conclude that
PK+(N,, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | (x(Q))Q∈R ∈ PK+(R, vR) and e(S, x, v) 6 0 for all S ∈ F0}. (5.2)
Thus, we define the bounded positive prekernel by
PKb+(N,, v) = {x ∈ PK+(N, v) | max{e(S, x, v) | S ∈ F , ℓ /∈ S ∋ k} = 0 for all k, ℓ ∈ N, k ≺· ℓ}.
(5.3)
Remark 5.1 On Γfree the positive prekernel is characterized by NE, AN, REAS, the weak reduced
game property (WRGP) the definition of which differs from RGP only inasmuch as only reduced games
w.r.t. coalitions S ⊆ N with |S| 6 2 are considered, CRGP, and weak unanimity for 2-person games
(WUTPG) requiring that, applied to any 2-person game (N, v), the solution contains {x ∈ X(N, v) |
xi > v({i}) for i ∈ N}. (Sudho¨lter and Peleg 2000, Theorem 7.1)
We now show that the result mentioned in Remark 5.1 may be generalized to Γ. A solution σ on
Γ′ ⊆ Γ satisfies WUTPG if for all (N,, v) ∈ Γ′ with |N | = 2, σ(N,, v) ⊇ {x ∈ X(N, v) | xi >
v({i}) for all minimal i ∈ N}.
Proposition 5.2 The positive prekernel is characterized by NE, AN, REAS, WRGP, CRGP, and
WUTPG.
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Proof: By Proposition 2.4 and non-emptiness of PK+(·) on Γfree, PK+(·) satisfies NE, and clearly it
satisfies AN and WUTPG. Moreover, REAS, RGP, and CRGP follow from (5.2) and the corresponding
properties on Γfree. In order to show the uniqueness part, let σ be a solution that satisfies the desired
properties. By WRGP applied to 1-person reduced games and REAS, σ satisfies PO. Moreover, for any
(N, v) ∈ Γfree, σ(N, v) = PK+(N, v) by the mentioned classical result. If (N,, v) ∈ Γ \ Γfree, then
|N | > 2. If |N | = 2, then by PO and REAS, σ(N,, v) ⊆ PK+(N,, v). By WUTPG, σ(N,, v) =
PK+(N,, v). If |N | > 2 and x ∈ σ(N,, v), then, by WRGP of σ, xS ∈ σ(S,, vS,x), and hence,
xS ∈ PK+(S,, vS,x), for all S ⊆ N with |S| = 2. By CRGP of PK+(·), x ∈ PK+(N,, v). The opposite
inclusion follows similarly by interchanging the roles of σ and PK+. q.e.d.
The bounded positive prekernel inherits NE, AN, REAS, RGP, and CRGP from the positive preker-
nel. Hence, the bounded variant exclusively violates WUTPG of the axioms in Proposition 5.2, i.e.,
PKb+(N,, v) is a singleton whenever |N | = 2 and (N,) has not height 0. Hence, we note that the
bounded positive prekernel is characterized by NE, AN, REAS, WRGP, CRGP, WUTPGfree (requiring
that the core is contained in the solution applied to any classical 2-person game), and BOUND.
Here, REAS cannot be deleted. Indeed, let t > 0 and, define the following solution σ by the requirement
that x ∈ σ(N,, v) if skℓ(x, v) 6 (sℓk(x, v))+ for all k, ℓ ∈ N, k 6= ℓ, and maxi∈S 6∋j,S∈F e(S, x, v) = 0
for all i, j ∈ N, i ≺ j, and v(N) − t 6 x(N) 6 v(N), then PKb+(·) is a subsolution of σ that, hence,
satisfies NE and WUTPGfree. Also, it satisfies BOUND and AN and the remaining properties (WRGP
and CRGP) are easily deduced as well. However, σ does not coincide with PKb+(·) already for 1-person
games.
6 On the logical independence of the employed axioms
By generalizing or slightly modifying the solution concepts σ1, . . . , σ5 of Orshan and Sudho¨lter (2010,
Sect. 4.1), we will show that each of the axioms (1) NE, (2) REAS (respectively, BOUND), (3) COV,
(4) RGP, (5) RCP (respectively, RCPfree) in Theorem 3.7 or Theorem 4.5, respectively, is logically
independent of the remaining axioms. Indeed, for any (N,, v) ∈ Γ with F = O(N,), R = R(N,),
and µ = maxT ⊆R e(T , ν(R, vR), vR), let
σ1(N,, v) = C(N,, v);
σ1b(N,, v) = Cb(N,, v);
σ2(N,, v) = X(N,, v);
σ3(N,, v) = NUC((max{e(S, ·, v), t})S∈F , X(N, v)) for some t < 0;
σ3b(N,, v) = {x ∈ σ3(N,, v) | max{e(S, x, v) | S ∈ F , ℓ /∈ S ∋ k} = t for all k, ℓ ∈ N, k ≺· ℓ};
σ4(N,, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | e(T , (x(Q))Q∈R, vR) 6 µ for T ⊆ R and e(S, x, v) 6 0 for S ∈ F0};
s4b(N,, v) = {x ∈ σ4(N,, v) | max{e(S, x, v) | S ∈ F , ℓ /∈ S ∋ k} = 0 for all k, ℓ ∈ N, k ≺· ℓ};
σ5(N,, v) = PK+(N,, v); and
σ5b(N,, v) = PKb+(N,, v).
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Then it is easy to check that σi satisfies all axioms from (1) to (5) except (i), for all i = 1, . . . , 5, and
similarly for σib and the bounded version of the axioms. Also, as mentioned, rint C+ satisfies all axioms
of Theorem 3.7 except CLOS. The solutions σ1 and σ1b, respectively, also show that NE is logically
independent in the characterization of the positive prekernel (Proposition 5.2) and its bounded variant.
Similarly, the (bounded) positive core has all properties except CRGP and the correspondence X only
violates REAS in Proposition 5.2. The solution that assigns the positive prekernel to each (N,, v) with
|N | 6 2 and otherwise the set of all reasonable preimputations only violates WRGP, and its bounded
variant may be used to show that RGP is independent of the remaining axioms in the characterization
of the bounded positive prekernel. We now generalize the definition of the solution of Example 8.3 of the
aforementioned article. Choose two players, say 1 and 2 and define, for all (N,, v) ∈ Γ, σ6(N,, v) =
PK+(N,, v) if |N | ≤ 2 and {1, 2} 6⊆ N or C(N,, v) 6= ∅. If N = {1, 2} and C(N,, v) = ∅ (hence the
height of (N,) is 0), put σ6(N,, v) = PK(N, v) ∪ {(v({1}), v(N)− v({1})), (v(N)− v({2}), v({2}))}.
For |N | > 3, put σ6(N,, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | xS ∈ σ6(S,, vS,x) for all S ⊆ N, |S| = 2} and let σ6b be
its bounded pendant. Hence,
σ6(N,, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | (x(Q))Q∈R ∈ σ
6(R, vR), e(S, x, v) 6 0 for all S ∈ F0} and
σ6b(N,, v) = {x ∈ σ6(N,, v) | max{e(S, x, v) | S ∈ F , ℓ /∈ S ∋ k} = 0 for all k, ℓ ∈ N, k ≺· ℓ}.
As in the classical case, σ6 (respectively, σ6b) satisfies NE, REAS (respectively, BOUND), RGP, CRGP,
and WUTPG (respectively, WUTPGfree); and it violates AN.
Let t > 0 and
σ7(N,, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | skℓ(x, v) 6 max{−t, sℓk(x, v)} for all k, ℓ ∈ N, k 6= ℓ}.
Then σ7 exclusively violates WUTPG and the variant defined by
σ7b(N,, v) = {x ∈ σ6(N,, v) | max{e(S, x, v) | S ∈ F , ℓ /∈ S ∋ k} = −t for all k, ℓ ∈ N, k ≺· ℓ}
satisfies the remaining axioms of the bounded positive prekernel.
We don’t know if ND is logically independent of the remaining axioms in the characterizing result of the
(bounded) positive core. We remark that ND is logically independent of NE, REAS (BOUND), COV,
and RGP on Γfree (Orshan and Sudho¨lter 2010), i.e., there are solutions that satisfy NE, REAS, COV,
and RGP, and do neither coincide with the prenucleolus nor with the positive core or its relative interior.
But as soon as an axiom is added that guarantees that the positive core is the only solution that has also
this property, then it is an open problem whether or not ND is still needed.
Moreover, we have to admit that we don’t know whether RCRGP is logically independent of the remaining
axioms in Theorem 4.5.
Finally, examples of the mentioned paper may be generalized to show that the infinity assumption on |U |
is necessary in the characterization of the (bounded) positive core and that for |U | = 2 the statement of
Proposition 5.2 is no longer valid.
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